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Ellis: Antitrust Law: An Application of the Sherman Act to the Professio
NOTES
ANTITRUST LAW: AN APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
TO THE PROFESSIONS*
Federal antitrust laws have historically been presumed inapplicable to both
internal and external activities of the learned professions., A similar presumption of antitrust immunity prevailed in the insurance industry until the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association2 extended the application of the antitrust laws to encompass restraints arising in the underwriting of interstate insurance contracts. As with
the insurance industry's presumption, there is no statutory basis on which an
assertion of professional immunity can be founded. The claim is apparently
premised solely upon negative inferences drawn from Supreme Court decisions.
Recently, however, various professional associations have been subjected to
antitrust attack. For example, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
has filed a civil antitrust action against the National Society of Professional
Engineers- charging violations of the Sherman Act. 4 In addition, the Department has obtained consent judgments enjoining the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 5 the American Institute of Architects, 6 and the
American Society of Civil Engineers 7 from future violations of the same statute.
The Antitrust Division has also secured a civil investigative demand s in its
investigation of the American Pharmaceutical Association and the Michigan
Pharmaceutical Association for possible antitrust violations. 9 In a recent landmark private civil antitrust action a federal district court has rendered judgment against a county bar association for violation of the Sherman Act. 10 Ex*EDITOR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the winter 1973 quarter.
1. The occupations requiring extensive educational training to which the term "learned
professions" would today apply are not clearly delineated. For the purposes of this note, it
will be assumed that the term encompasses at least the legal and medical professions as well
as professional engineers, certified public accountants, architects, and pharmacists.
2. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
3. Complaint, United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-72
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 1972).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970) (originally enacted July 2, 1890).
5. United States v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants, 5 TRADE REC. REP.
(1972 Trade Cas.) ff 74, 007 (D.D.C. July 6, 1972).
6. United States v. American Institute of Architects, 5 TRADE REa. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
73,981 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972), as modified by exchange of correspondence, 74,074 (D.D.C.
June 19, 1972).
7. United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.)
f173,950 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1972).
8. The civil investigative demands were issued pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1312 (1970).
9. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Justice, 467 F.2d 1290 (6th
Cir. 1972), aff'g 344 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (denying plaintiff's request for order setting
aside civil investigative demand on charges of Justice Department harassment).
10. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), appeal docketed,
No. 73-1248, 4th Cir. March 1, 1973.
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cept for those actions resulting in consent judgments, the defendants in this
recent litigation have all claimed immunity from the federal antitrust laws.""
Yet despite these claims, public statements by Justice Department officials indicate that the Antitrust Division will continue to allocate a substantial por12
tion of its resources in seeking to enjoin restraints of trade in the professions.
In evaluating the applicability of federal antitrust law to the learned professions, this note will focus upon conduct of the legal and medical professions. 13 An examination of the basis and validity of the asserted immune status
of the learned professions from antitrust laws will be the central concern,
which in turn will be complemented by a discussion of the jurisdictional question of interstate commerce and an analysis of the potential defense of valid
state action immunity.

THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
In examining the relationship between professional conduct and antitrust
law the statutory language of primary concern is found in the Sherman Act,
which states in part: 4
§1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ....
§8. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the
United States or of the District of Columbia ... is hereby declared to
be illegal.
The language of the Act is expansive in scope, somewhat comparable to
the great clauses of the Constitution.15 Although couched in common law
terms,26 the Act seemingly was not meant merely as a reenactment of the
common law of trade restraints and monopolies,' 7 since there existed no
unitary body of common law in 1890 on which the Act could have been predicated.18 The frequent references to common law in the legislative history of

11.

See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973); Answer, United

States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-72 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 9, 1973).
12. See, e.g., Remarks of Ass't Att'y Gen. Thomas E. Kauper, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Meeting, Jan. 24, 1973, in BNA ANT rRusT &TRADE RPE. REP. No. 598, Jan. 30, 1973, at DI; Remarks of Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. Bruce B. Wilson, Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Conference of

County Bar Officers, March 25, 1972.
13. "The professional tradition began with doctors and lawyers, and in medicine and
law has found its highest successes." J. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF rHE EXPERTS 7 (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. (1970).
15. E.g., The Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONSr. art. , §8 (18).
16. See generally Allen, Criminal Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade at Common Law,
23 HARv. L. Rv. 531 (1909).
17. P. AREEDA, ANTrIRUST ANALYsIs 23 (1967).

18. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcON. 7, 36

(1966R.
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the Act'5 can be distinguished simply as the senators' own selection of recent
cases interpreted in light of their policy suggestions. 20 Moreover, Professor
Areeda has suggested that the use of the common law terms without elaboration was intended to vest a new jurisdiction in the federal courts. 21 Con22
sequently, in his opinion Congress intended the Sherman Act to be viewed:
[N]ot as a prohibition of any specific conduct but as a general authority
to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain customary
techniques of judicial reasoning, to consider the reasoning and results
of other common law courts, and to develop, refine, and innovate in the
dynamic common law tradition.
The surprising lack of debate in the 51st Congress concerning antitrust
policy, 22 coupled with the absence of statutory guidelines, has left the precise
legislative intent of the Act somewhat ambiguous. 24 One examination of the
Act's legislative history has nevertheless concluded that Congress intended the
courts to implement one general value, that of consumer welfare.2 5 Thus, the
Sherman Act can be interpreted as vesting the courts with a new jurisdiction
in expansive language devoid of guidelines save the general purpose of protecting or maximizing the welfare of the consuming public.
In protecting consumer welfare under the Act the courts must find a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." 2 Although the language of the statute is all-encompassing, 2r the Supreme Court in
Standard Oil v. United States2s formulated a "rule of reason," construing as
unlawful only those agreements that unreasonably restrained competition.
Chief Justice White stated that the Act "was expressly designed not to unduly
limit [its] application . . . by [making a] precise definition" of the restraint

19. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). The bill "does not announce a new principle of
law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common law" (remarks of Senator
Sherman); 21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890). "We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common
law" (remarks of Senator Hoar); 21 CONG. REC. 3148 (1890). The intent was to define the
offense in "terms that were well known to the law already" (remarks of Senator Edmunds).
20. Bork, supra note 18, at 37.
21. P. AREFDA, supra note 17, at 23.
22. Id. at 23-24. Bork has commented that Congress seemed to have "specified a value, a
core of meaning, and left it to the courts to elaborate a framework of subsidiary rules." Bork,
supra note 18, at 35.
23. J. CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY 38 (1931).
24. See Note, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1963 Wis.
L. REv. 1237, 1241.
25.

Bork, supra note 18.

26. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
27. The Act purports to include: "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce." Id.
28. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Chief Justice White stated it was intended that the "standard of
reason which had been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the
purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided." Id. at 60.
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it was intended to encompass.- Instead, the Act defined the "ulterior bound-

aries" within which the courts were intended to apply a "rule of reason" in
determining those activities that were within its broadly defined scope.30 An
application of this rule thus includes a consideration of the facts peculiar to
the business to which the challenged restraint has been applied, the condition

of the business before and after the imposition of the restraint, and the nature
of the restraint and its effect.31
Although the Court has generally employed the "rule of reason" in de-

termining the legality of alleged restraints, some classes of restraints have been
conclusively presumed unreasonable because of their unduly restrictive nature.32 Horizontal price fixing arrangements, for example, have been considered the classic per se violation of the Act "because of their pernicious ef-

fect on competition."33 Likewise, arrangements "formed for the purpose and
34
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" prices
have been held to constitute per se violations of the Act. Such arrangements

have been found in the professions in the form of schedules fixing the prices
of both commodities's and services.38
PROFESSIONAL AcrrTy
The professions have been involved in various activities that appear

fraught with antitrust violations. The bar association price schedules utilized
by attorneys, the imposition by both legal and medical associations of un-

reasonable licensing requirements, the pharmaceutical associations' restraints
on advertising, and the prohibitions of competitive bidding by architecture,
29. Id. at 63-64.
30. Id. at 64.
31. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Other relevant facts
include the "history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be attained." Id.
32. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). See also Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
33. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Go., 273
U.S. 392 (1927). For examples of other per se restraints, see United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal territory restrictions); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 44-45 (1965) (tying arrangements). In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958), Justice Black explained the appropriateness of the per se rules: "This principle
of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine . ..
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable -an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken." Id. See generally Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50
VA. L. R v. 1165 (1964).
34. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
35. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
36. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), appeal docketed,
No. 73-1248, 4th Cir., March 1, 1973.
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accountant, and engineering associations are all possible antitrust violations.
Of these, perhaps the activities of the legal and medical professions have the
most direct effect upon the consuming public.
Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules
Schedules recommending minimum fees that lawyers should charge for
various professional legal services 37 have been adopted by at least thirty-three
states 3 and hundreds of local bar associations. 3 Surveys, in fact, conclude that
"[t]he use of fee schedules ... has emerged as the dominant system of pricing
in the legal service industry." 40 Theoretically, these schedules give the lowest
fee that a reasonably competent attorney can charge and expect to receive a
reasonable return "considering the factors of skill, time and overhead expenses." 41 The fee schedules are clearly not intended as a mandatory charge, 42
but rather are designed to be employed by the attorney as one of several
criteria in determining the reasonableness of his fee. 4 3 Nevertheless, bar association ethics committees have strongly discouraged pricing below the recom-

37.

E.g., BAR AsSOCIATION OF THE EICHTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUrr

OF FLORIDA,

MINIMUM

FEE

SCHEDULE (adopted March 6, 1970) lists the suggested minimum fee for an uncontested
divorce as $300.
38. Arnould & Corley found that thirty-four states had adopted a jurisdiction minimum
fee schedule. Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655, 656
(1971). However, at least one state, Georgia, has abolished its statewide schedule. See Cleveland, President'sAnnual Address, 9 GA. ST. B.J. 77, 83 (1972).
39. Arnould K- Corley, supra note 38, at 656.
40. Arnould, Pricing Professional Services: A Case Study of the Legal Service Industry,
38 So. ECON. J. 495, 497 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Arnould].
41. American Bar Association, Minimum Fee Schedules -Neither Fish nor Fowl, 29
LEGAL ECON. NEws 5 (1971).
42. Most schedules use such words as "advisory," "recommended," or "suggested" to describe their status. See Arnould 9&Corley, supra note 38, at 656. Generally, the schedules
refer to ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 12, which provides in part: "[I]t is proper
for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no
lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole guide in
determining the amount of his fee." However, effective Jan. 1, 1970, the Canons of Professional Ethics were replaced by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides in
relevant part that "[s]uggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-18. See also Opinions of the Committee of Professional Ethics,
Formal Opinion 323, Aug. 9, 1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1970).
43. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 12 provided: "In determining the amount
of the fee, it is proper to consider: (I) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether
the acceptance of employment in the particular case will preclude the lawyer's appearance
for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction ....
(3) the customary charges of
the Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client ....
(5) . . .the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character
of the employment . . . . No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are
mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the service."
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mended levels by threatening the attorney who undercuts the schedule with
44
charges of unethical conduct and solicitation.
There is also evidence that the oligopolistic uniformity inherent in this
system of pricingW5 has elevated fees beyond the point of competitive equilibrium. 4 6 In fact, this same evidence indicates that in all probability "the fee
schedules could not fulfill their purposes if the prices fixed were not above
the competitive level." 47 Although the paucity of empirical data in the area
makes it difficult to determine the extent to which prices are enhanced above
the competitive level, studies have shown that a substantial number of lawyers
use schedules to determine fees 48 and that such use not only raises the price of

44. Remarks of Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. Bruce B. Wilson, supra note 11. See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973); ABA COMM. ON PROFssIOINAL ETHCS,
OPINIONs, No. 302 (1967), which states: "Mhe habitual charging of fees less than those
established in...

recommended minimum fee schedules . . . may be evidence of unethical

conduct." (Emphasis added.) This pronouncement has recently been reaffirmed in Formal
Opinion 323, supra note 42, which interprets both Canon of Professional Ethics No. 12 and
its counterpart in the Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 2-18. The
Committee on Professional Ethics has also stated in Formal Opinion 323: "Mhat mere failure
to follow a minimum fee schedule, even when habitual, cannot standing alone and absent
evidence of misconduct, afford a basis for disciplinary action." It should also be noted that
the ABA has advised bar associations in drafting fee schedules that "[a] strong ethical
injunction against fee cutting should be included." ABA COMM. ON ECONOMICS OF LAw
PRACTCE, MINIMUM

FEE SCHrDULES-

MANUAL

FOR ASSISTANCE

OF STATE

AND

LOCAL

BAR

CoMMrrrFaz 9 (1963). But see Lawyer, Defend Thy Fee, 59 A.BA.J. 79 (1973), where it is
reported that as a result of attacks from various sources many bar associations have recently

eliminated any language of enforcement from their schedules.
45. Fixed minimum fees will tend to set a uniform minimum that will be charged by
attorneys for specific services much akin to the uniformity of minimum prices found among
producers in oligopolistic markets. Cf. Arnould, supra note 40; Note, A Critical Analysis of
Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARv. L. REv. 971, 976-81 (1972). See generally
P. AREmA, supra note 17, at 217-21. But see Miller 8-Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee

Schedules, 58 A.B.AJ. 31 (1972) (contending generally that schedules do not fix a price for
legal services).
46. See generally Arnould, supra note 40; Note, supra note 45, at 978, 980-81; cf. Lyons,
Monopoly in the Health Industries: The Role of Professional Associations in the Inflation of

Medical Service Prices, 5 ANrrrmnsr LAw & ECON. REV. 95 (1971) (supporting the thesis that
"professional" prices will exceed "competitive" prices).
47. Arnould, supra note 40, at 499. The generally pronounced purposes or advantages of
minimum fee schedules are: (1) to increase the income of lawyers; (2) to educate the public

on the subject of legal fees; (3) to provide a standardized fee, thus eliminating wide
divergences in continguous geographical areas; (4) to increase the quality of service; (5) to
discourage "lawyer shopping"; (6) to provide judges with a guide when called upon to
determine fees; and (7) to provide new entrants into the profession with a guide to determine fees. ABA COMM. ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACIcE, supra note 44, at 5-6. As Arnould
points out, purposes (1) and (5) "are directly related to attempts to reduce competition and
provide monopoly returns." Arnould, supra note 40, at 499. For a critical analysis of the
primary justifications given for the use of schedules, see Note, supra note 45, at 981-92.
48. Arnould & Corley, supra note 38, at 660-61; Arnould, supra note 40, at 503-05.
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legal services, 49 but also results in a misallocation of resources within the profession itself.50
Similar pricing schedules have consistently been prohibited under the
Sherman Act51 and there has, in fact, been one recent successful challenge of
bar association minimum fee schedules. A federal district court in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar52 held the schedule in question a form of price fixing and
therefore per se unlawful. Since, as the court noted, the "defendant's liability
under the Sherman Act depends not on actual adherence to the schedule but
rather on the mere existence of an agreement which restricts competition by
price fixing,"5 3 bar association fee schedules as they now exist appear to constitute an unlawful restraint of trade.
Apparently as a result of attack from various sources, including the Justice
Department and the Goldfarb decision, some bar associations have recently
rescinded their fee schedules. 54 Simple elimination of the schedules, however,
may not completely abrogate antitrust problems, since where schedules have
existed for substantial periods, members of the bar may continue to charge
the previously fixed minimum fees. In such situations, therefore, the possibility
of a conspiracy to charge such fees remains. The Act condemns any agreement
to set prices, tacit or express, 5 and consciously parallel pricing may infer such
an agreement. 56 To rebut an inference of such an agreement, the practitioners
would be required to show independent business justifications for their allegedly concerted conduct. 57 Consequently, bar associations should heed the

49. Arnould & Corley, supra note 38, at 657; Arnould, supra note 40, at 501-02. The
extent to which the profession's income is raised by these higher prices depends upon the
elasticity of demand for legal services. The demand for legal services is generally assumed to
be highly inelastic, therefore, depending also upon the number of lawyers previously charging
below the set minima and the degree of adherence to the schedule, the total profession's
income should be raised. See Arnould, supra note 40, at 501; Note, supra note 45, at 978-79.
50. See generally Arnould, supra note 40; Note, supra note 45, at 981, which reasons
that "because set minima draw excess profits to the profession, disproportionate manpower
may ultimately be channeled to the bar [and] . . . [s]ince elevated fees force some clients
to forego services, the expanded group of attorneys clustered about the minima has less
business than under competitive pricing."
51. See, e.g., Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
52. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
53. Id. at 493-94. See also Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1960).
54. See, e.g., Remarks of Donald 1. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division,
before the Ninth Annual Conference on Federal Tax and Other Problems of Non-Profit
Organizations, Feb. 9, 1973, in BNA ANTITRUsT TRADE REG. REP. No. 601, Feb. 20, 1973, at
El; Lawyer, Defend Thy Fee, supra note 44.
55. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954).
56. See id. at 541, where Justice Clark stated: "Circumstantial evidence of consciously
parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely." See also Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d
199, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
57. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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teaching of Justice Douglas in United States v. Container Corporation of
America5 that "interference with the setting of price by free market forces is
unlawful per se."
UnreasonableLicensing Requirements
The creation of barriers to entering an occupation by imposing licensing
requirements is also an area of professional activity in which serious antitrust
questions may arise, particularly where bar and medical associations are involved. "[T]he licensed monopolies which professions enjoy constitute, in
themselves, severe restraints upon competition. But they are restraints which
depend upon capacity and training, not special privilege." 59 However, when
admission requirements eclipse those necessary to insure sufficient "capacity
and training," those requirements constitute unlawful barriers to entering that
profession.6 o
A majority of jurisdictions have integrated bars, 61 organized under the
ultimate control of the state judiciary.62 Although the courts have ultimate
control, the task of promulgating admission requirements is typically delegated
to a board or committee composed of members of the bar.63 A perusal of most
bar admission requirements will show "a distinct leaning toward the protection of the local student and the local lawyer with much the same effect as is
created by ordinary trade barriers." 64 Commentators have frequently attacked
high admission fees, 65 bar examinations, 66 and residency requirements- r as

58. 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
59. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 130 F.2d 233, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943). See also Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & EcoN. 93, 95 (1961).
60. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
61. The unified or integrated bar has been described as one in which the "important
function of bar government will be handled on a self-governing basis by committees established and manned by the bar itself and not by the court and subject only to necessary
supreme court supervision and review. The net result is more, not less, independence for
the bar." Winters, The Unified Bar, 23 ARk. L. RI-v. 526, 530-31 (1969). At least thirty states
and Puerto Rico now have integrated bars. Id. at 530.
62. See generally Bard & Barnford, The Bar: Professional Association or Medieval Guild?,
19 CATHOLic U.L. REv. 393 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bard & Barnford].
63. See, e.g., RuLEs OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA RELATING TO ADmISSIONS TO THE
BAR art. I, §§2, 3 (1970).
64. Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 102 (1944).
65. See, e.g., Bard & Barnford, supra note 62, at 436; Marcus, Civil Rights and the AntiTrust Laws, 18 U. COH.L. REv. 171 (1951).
66. See, e.g., Bard & Barnford, supra note 62, at 425-26. The bar examination is generally
imposed upon recent law graduates; however, "ten states require that attorneys duly licensed
to practice law in other jurisdictions, without regard to the length of time they have practiced, must sit for and pass a bar examination." Id. at 425. Query: Whether the fact that
one-half of these states - California, Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and Hawaii - are retirement
states is mere coincidence? Id. at 426. Bar examinations have also been attacked as racially
discriminatory. See, e.g., Openers, 2 JURs DocroR 2, 33 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Bard & Barnford, supra note 62; Note, Residence Requirements for Initial
Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposal for Change, 56 COauau. L. REv. 831 (1971).
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exceeding the minimum required to insure sufficient "capacity and training"
of applicants. If these various restrictions imposed in fact surpass the necessary minimum, then unlawful barriers to entrance into the legal profession
exist.
Restrictions placed upon entrance into the medical profession may also
surpass that required to insure sufficient "capacity and training" of applicants.6 For example, the states have generally required applicants for
medical licensure to be graduates of American Medical Association (AMA)
approved medical schools.69 By thus conferring upon the AMA the power to
approve medical schools, the states have consequently delegated the power to
set standards for approval. 0 Furthermore, encompassed in this power to set
standards is the power to determine the size of the medical school classes 7'
and ultimately, the number of potential entrants into the profession.7 2 In
purporting to serve "both the buyers and sellers of physicians' services in determining the output of physicians" the AMA sustains "an inevitable conflict
of interests," 73 which has resulted in the restraining of the supply of physicians
4
to the public's detriment and organized medicine's economic advantage.
Cases arising under the Sherman Act in which one has been prevented from
entering a business are few. 75 The courts have, however, seen "no difference

between strangling competition which is not yet born and driving an existing
competitor out of business." 76 Indicative of this view are the decisions involving the motion picture industry in which the growth of competition had been
suppressed by the purchasing of excess supplies of motion picture film. 77 In
one such case the Court stated that "the anti-trust laws are as much violated
by the prevention of competition as by its destruction."78s If the restraints

Residence requirements for bar admission have also been challenged as being unconstitutional. Compare Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp.
1392 (D. Hawaii 1971) and Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971), with
Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
68. See, e.g., Kennedy, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics
in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937 (1954); Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of
Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 267 (1970).

69. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 969.
70. Id. at 970.
71. Id.
72.

Id.;

J.

LIEBERMAN,

supra note 13, at 27. See also A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

(1910).

73. Kessel, supra note 68, at 282. See also J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 13, at 119-20.
74. See Kennedy, supra note 68, at 974; Kessel, supra note 68, at 276.
75. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 133 (1958).
76. Id. See United States v. The College of American Pathologists (1969 Trade Cas.)
72,825 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969) (consent decree enjoining defendants from attempting to
prevent other persons from entering or conducting a commercial medical laboratory business).

77. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
78. Id. at 107. See also Associated Press v. United States, 226 U.S. 1 (1945), wherein
Justice Black stated: "Trade restraints . . . aimed at the destruction of competition, tend to
block the initiative which brings newcomers into a field of business and to frustrate the
free enterprise system which it was the purpose of the Sherman Act to protect .... " Id.
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placed on entering the professions are found to be unreasonable, 79 then, assuming the professions are subject to antitrust laws, the reasoning of these
cases would be applicable.
OBSTACLES TO SHERmAN

ACT

APPLICATION

Application of the expansive language of the Sherman Act has been limited
by both legislatively80 and judiciallys ' created exemptions 82 or immunities. 83
Legislatively created exemptions will generally not affect professional activity
and therefore the concern here will be with those immunities that have arisen
84
from judicial interpretations of the language and purpose of the Act.
In a single phrase - "trade or commerce among the several states" - the Act
defines both the activities that it purports to protect from restraints and its
jurisdictional scope. Thus, the initial substantive inquiry in any case is
whether the defendant's conduct restrains activity in which Congress intended
to foster free competition. The response of many professional associations is
that the rendering of professional services does not constitute "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Act. Yet even if the professional activity
restrained is found to constitute "trade or commerce," the further jurisdictional question must be considered, since the Act requires, for constitutional
reasons, that the "trade or commerce" be "among the several states." 's Moreover, if the activity restrained is found to constitute "trade or commerce
among the several states," a further issue must be resolved when state regulation is present, since the Sherman Act is not directed toward valid state action.8 0 These three issues - the existence of "professional immunity," absence
of interstate commerce, and valid state action immunity - are those upon
which the professions generally rely to remove their conduct from the scope of
the Act.

at 13-14.
79. See text accompanying notes 59-74 supra.
80. See 4 TRADE RFG. RuE. f1125,111-26,647 for a text of all legislatively created exemptions.
81. See generally Note, The Anatomy of Judicial Exemptions from Antitrust: A Study
in Gap-Filling,15 WAYNE L. REv. 813 (1969).
82. These exemptions affect as much as 20% of the nation's private economy. Pogue,
Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ABA AwnrnRusT L.J. 1 (1967).
83. The following semantic distinction has been propounded in support of using "im-

munity" instead of "exemption" when referring to those judicially created: "'Immunity' implies that a subject has never been encompassed by a rule of conduct; 'exemption' implies
that a topic under regulation has been subsequently withdrawn from that regulation." White,
Participant Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50
TExAs L. Rav. 474, 476 (1972).
84. See generally Nawalanic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust
Laws, 21 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 97, 108-10 (1972); Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from
Antitrust, 19 ABA AwrrRusr L.J. 313 (1961).
85.
86.

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §8(3). See text accompanying notes 159-161 infra.
See text accompanying notes 177-179 infra,
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ProfessionalImmunity
The basis for any immune status of the learned professions from the expansive language of the Sherman Act is at best implied from negative inferences intimated in Supreme Court and lower court opinions. Whether the
rendering of professional personal services constitutes "trade or commerce"
within the meaning of the Act87 is a question that has been gingerly avoided
by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions8$ The lower courts, however,
have nevertheless responded with divergent and conflicting views.8 9
The presumption that the rendering of personal services was not "trade or
commerce" initially arose from Supreme Court dictum in Federal Baseball
Clubs of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs.9°
Holding baseball immune from the Act, the Court there stated that "personal
effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." 91 The Court
later observed, however, that the controlling consideration in FederalBaseball
was the absence of interstate commerce, not a finding of per se immunity of
personal services from the Sherman Act. 92 More recently the Court has recog-

nized that baseball is engaged in interstate commerce, but has declined to
bring the national sport within the scope of the antitrust laws. 93 Thus, Federal
Baseball stands today an aberration applicable to professional baseball alone, 94
solely as a result of congressional inaction. 95
In two later cases the Court expressly rejected any notion of per se immunity of personal services from the Act. In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.
United States96 the petitioners argued that the business of cleaning and dyeing
wearing apparel consisted "solely of the performance of labor and the rendering of a personal service," which did not constitute "trade or commerce." 97

87. See, e.g., Coleman, Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 48 (1967).
88. See text accompanying notes 101-136 infra.
89. See text accompanying notes 113-130, 136-154 infra.
90. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
91. Id. at 209. The lower court had similarly distinguished between "sport" and "trade
or commerce." National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
92. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955).
93. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
94. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding Federal
Baseball inapplicable to professional football); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955)
(holding Federal Baseball inapplicable to theatrical productions); Washington Professional
Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding
professional basketball within the Sherman Act's scope).
95. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), wherein the Court stated as
a result of the Federal Baseball decision "the business [of professional baseball] has . . .
been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislaion ....
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball
within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Id. at 357. The Court affirmed both Federal
Baseball and Toolson in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972), stating that the plaintiff's
"remedy... is for congressional, and not judicial, action." Id.
96. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
97. Id. at 429.
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Rejecting this reasoning, the Court adopted a broad definition of "trade" that
encompassed the rendering of such personal services. This definition was, in
turn, further broadened in United States v. National Association of Real
Estate Boards98 wherein respondents contended that services of real estate
agents did not constitute trade or commerce. The Court there stated: 99
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather
than commodities does not take it out of the category of "trade"....
The Act was aimed at combinations organized and directed to control
the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and
services.
Both Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers and National Real Estate Boards, however,
arose under section 3 of the Sherman Act, 10 0 which concerns only restraints on
trade or commerce within the District of Columbia. In Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers the Court pointed out that in passing section 1101 Congress was restricted
by the Commerce Clause.1 02 However, in passing section 3 Congress was unlimited "except as restricted by other provisions of the Constitution."'0 8 Thus,
the argument could be asserted that the scope of section 1 is not sufficiently
broad to encompass the personal services deemed "trade or commerce" under
section 3.104
Considering other factors, however, the efficacy of this argument has been
all but destroyed. National Real Estate Boards cited with approval dictum in
an earlier section 1 case that had defined the scope of the Sherman Act as including both goods and services.105 In addition, subsequent decisions regarding
real estate boards and other service-rendering groups located outside the District of Columbia,0 0 as well as the opinion in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,0 T
indicate a definite application of section 1 to personal services. 0
The question of the Sherman Act's applicability to professional personal
services nevertheless remains clouded. Both National Real Estate Boards and
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers assigned a broad definition to the term "trade." In
so doing each also quoted the language from which the initial inference of an
exclusion of professional personal services from the scope of "trade" most
98.
99.
100.
101.

339 U.S. 485 (1950).
Id.at 490.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
102. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §8(3).
103. Atlantic Cleaners 9- Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
104. See Coleman, supra note 87, at 50 n.14.
105. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950), discussing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492 (1940).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Memphis Bd. of Realtors, 5 TRADE Rc. REP. (1972 Trade
Cas.) 3f74,056 (W.D. Tenn. June 27, 1972); United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of
Realtors, Inc. (1971 Trade Cas.) 373,393 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 1970).
107. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973) (including within the scope of §1 minimum fee
schedules for the sale of professional legal services).
108. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v.
Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
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likely stemmed. 10 9 That quoted language, written by Judge Story in The
Schooner Nymph,110 construed the term "trade" as used in the Coasting and
2
1
Fishery Act of 1793 ' stating:1

[T]he word "trade" is ... generally, used ... as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile. Whereever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the
learned professions, it is constantly called a trade.
Although the quotation was dispositive of the issues in neither case, 1 13 the
express exclusion of the learned professions from what the Court considered
in each instance a broad definition of "trade" does raise an inference of immunity. Yet in National Real Estate Boards the Court left the question of the
Act's applicability to professional personal services completely open by expressly declining to "intimate an opinion on the correctness of the application
of the term [trade] to the professions .... ,,14
Reluctance on the part of the Court to rule on the status of professions
under the Act was not original to National Real Estate Boards. The Court in
earlier opinions had distinguished between "professions" and "trade." For
example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam" 5 the Court, explaining
doctors were not engaged in the patent medicine trade, stated that "medical
practitioners . . . follow a profession and not a trade." 16 Making a similar
distinction in a case involving the dental profession, the Court emphasized
that the professions demanded "different standards of conduct from those
7
which are traditional in the competition of the market place.""
Perhaps the language of these decisions set the tone for subsequent pronouncements. The first opinions to squarely meet the question of professions
and the Act arose in the course of a single case in which the American Medical
Association and others were indicted for allegedly conspiring to impose unlawful restraints on physicians affiliated with a group health association. 1 8 In
the initial AMA decision the district court sustained a demurrer to the indictment, viewing the Supreme Court's earlier exclusion of professions from the
broad definition of "trade" as controlling." 9 The circuit court, however, re-

109. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1932).
110. 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C. Me. 1834).
111. 1 STAT. 305 (1793).
112. The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (No. 10,388) (C.C. Me. 1834) (emphasis
added).
113. See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
114. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
115. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
116. Id. at 653.
117. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935).
118. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939).
119. Id. at 755. See also text accompanying notes 110-113 supra.
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versed, viewing the exclusion as purely casual.J20 In so doing the court expressly held the practice of medicine within the scope of section 3 of the Act.
Giving "trade" its broadest definition, the opinion concluded that trade "when
embraced in the phrase 'restraint of trade' .. covers all occupations in which
1 21
men are engaged for a livelihood."
Affirming the district court's conviction on remand, the circuit court
reiterated its earlier view that the rendering of medical services constituted
"trade or commerce" within the scope of the Act.1 22 The court likewise emphasized that although the professions enjoy licensed monopolies, those monopolies are not without limits. When professional group activities "go so far
as to impose unreasonable restraints, they become subject to the prohibition
123
of the Sherman Act."
Although this statement of limits to professional monopoly activity was
124
realistically consistent with the Act's intent to protect consumer welfare,
the Supreme Court nevertheless found it unnecessary to pass on such a view. 1 25
Instead, the Court treated the group health association as a commercial enterprise engaged in the business of providing prepaid medical care on a risksharing basis. Although the AMA's unlawful conduct was directed toward the
physicians employed by Group Health, the Court considered the occupation
of the individual physicians immaterial, since the "purpose and effect" of the
conspiracy was to obstruct the business of Group Health. 20 Drawing this
dubious distinction, when presented with an excellent opportunity to rule
firmly on the profession's status under the Act, was simply one more illustration of the Court's reluctance to confront the question.
In a subsequent case involving prepaid medical care, the Oregon district
court ruled that the practice of medicine did not constitute "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Act.127 Apparently realizing the Supreme
Court's reluctance 28 to rule directly on this question, the Justice Department
on direct appeal 129 posed the issue as whether the business of providing prepaid medical care, not the practice of medicine, constituted "trade or commerce."'13 0 However, "[s]ince no concerted refusal to deal with private health

120. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 709 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 644 (1940).
121. Id. at 710.
122. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943).
123.

Id. at 248.

124. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
125. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103, 118 (D. Ore. 1950),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
128. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
129. The 1903 Expediting Act, 26 STAT. §23 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§28-29 (1970),
provides that appeal from the district court's final judgment in government civil antitrust
actions lies only to the Supreme Court.

130. Brief for Appellant at 3, 172, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326 (1952).
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associations"' 131 had been proved, the Court reached neither issue. 132 Nevertheless the Court found it appropriate to add that "[florms of competition
usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of
13
a profession."' 3
In contrast, the lower courts have been somewhat unconcerned with
"ethical standards" when professionals have engaged in price-fixing activities.
13
In both Northern California PharmaceuticalAssociation v. United States 4
35
and United States v. Utah PharmaceuticalAssociation
the defendants were
convicted of conspiring to fix the prices of prescription drugs by maintaining
uniform prices and establishing pricing schedules. The defendants in Northern
California Pharmaceuticalcontended that the activities with which they had
been charged were nothing more than reasonable regulations of various aspects
of their professional activity. 3 6 However, since the defendants had fixed the
price of a commodity, the area of activity in which they had run afoul of the
Sherman Act was "entrepreneurial" rather than "professional."' 37 Premised
upon this distinction, the court considered the defendant's professional status
"utterly irrelevant.""38 Professional status alone was insufficient to immunize
a group from the Sherman Act "if the activity in which they are shown to
have engaged is clearly proscribed by the statute." 39 The court, nevertheless,
was explicit in stating that no determination had been made as to the status
40
of every professional activity under the Sherman Act.
In Utah Pharmaceuticalthe district court followed much the same reasoning as the Ninth Circuit in Northern California Pharmaceutical, but added
that had the major concern of the pricing schedule been professional services
rather than commodities, the outcome may have been different.' The court
explicitly distinguished "drug pricing schedules" from "professional service
schedules," making clear that the latter's status under the antitrust laws had
not been determined.

42

Although the pharmaceutical decisions somewhat eroded the presumption
of professional immunity, the question of whether professional service pricing
schedules would be distinguished from professional commodity schedules remained undecided. This question has now been answered, at least at the district court level, by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar."43
131.
132.

United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952).
Id.

133. Id.
134. 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
135. 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962), appeal dismissed, 306 F.2d 493 (10th Cir.), dismissal of appeal aft'd, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
136. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
137. Id. at 385.
138. Id. at 384.
139. Id. at 385.
140. Id. at 386.
141. United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29, 34-35 (D. Utah 1962).
142. Id. at 36.
143. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1248, 4th Cir., March 1,
1973).
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Goldfarb stands as the first successful challenge of bar association minimum
fee schedules under federal antitrust law. The defendant bar association's
contention that professional legal services did not constitute "trade" within
the meaning of the Sherman Act merited little discussion from the court.1"
Noting that the expansive language of the Act had engendered a reluctance
in the courts to find such exemptions, especially when price fixing was involved 145 the court simply chose to rely on National Real Estate Board's definition of "trade" as including the rendering of personal services.' 4"
Even though Goldfarb unequivocally declined to recognize any professional
immunity147 its holding is applicable only to the fixing of professional service
pricing. Cognizant of the larger issue, the court questioned whether adoption
of minimum fee schedules could be considered professional, and remarked
that fee setting was certainly "the least 'learned' part of the profession."'' 4
Nevertheless, the absence in Goldfarb of the limiting language found in both
pharmaceutical cases149 remains significant.
In light of the district court's decision in Goldfarb the minimum fee
schedules of the professions would seem to stand on tenuous ground. For example, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has recently obtained
consent decrees enjoining three professional associations from suppressing price
competition. 59 Nevertheless, a complaint filed against the National Society of
Professional Engineers charging suppression of price competition' 5' has been
answered with the assertion that "the work and labor of a human being is not
a commodity or article of commerce within the meaning of the antitrust
laws."'152 Such an answer indicates that in the eyes of some members of the
antitrust bar, the presumption of professional immunity is in fact a reality.
At least one other case arising under the Sherman Act may be of assistance
in determining the status of the professions under the Act. In Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges & Sec-

144. Id. at 495.
145. Id. at 493.
146. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
147. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 495 (E.D. Va. 1973). Although
not identifying the language to which he referred, Judge Bryan stated that his ruling was

"despite dicta by ... [the Supreme] court." Id.
148. Id.

149. See text accompanying notes 140, 142 supra.
150. United States v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 174,007 (D.D.C. July 6, 1972); United States v. American Institute of

Architects, 5 TRADE RE;. R"s,. (1972 Trade Cas.) f173,981 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972), as amended,
174,074 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972); United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 5 TRADE R.E.
(1972 Trade Cas.) ff73,950 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1972).
151. Complaint, United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-72
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 1972).
REP.

152. Answer, United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, Civil No. 2412-72
(D.D.C. filed Jan. 9, 1973).
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ondary Schools, Inc. 5 3 the district court ruled that defendant, a voluntary
nonprofit organization whose chief activities included accrediting member
institutions, had unlawfully restrained plaintiff's ability to compete by refusing to consider it for accreditation. In reversing the judgment, the circuit court
found the process of accreditation to be an activity not generally defined as
trade or commerce within the meaning of the Act. 5 4 The reasoning employed
was premised upon the view that the Sherman Act was not tailored "for the
noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts or the learned professions."' 5- More
importantly, however, the court conceived of situations involving the accreditation process in which antitrust law would be applicable. Such a situation
would exist when the restrictions on eligibility had been imposed with a com156
mercial motive.
An application of this reasoning to the suppression of price competition
activities of the professions and their imposition of unreasonable entrance requirements would be consistent with the Act's purpose of protecting consumer
welfare. Certainly one would have difficulty asserting that professional activities affecting price competition are "noncommercial aspects" of that profession. Furthermore, whether the activity involved consists of pricing schedules for commodities or services or the prohibition of competitive bidding, the
economic result is the same. In our economic system the suppression of price
competition in whatever form, without sufficient economic justification, affects
consumer welfare and should be subject to the Act.
Activities unreasonably restraining entry into the professions likewise affect
consumer welfare. When those activities can be shown to have commercial
motives, Marjorie Webster would subject them to the Act. However, antitrust
policy - the protection of consumer welfare - demands that the Act extend
even further. If the activities can be shown to have a commercial or economic
effect upon consumer welfare, then those activities should be subjected to the
strictures of the Act without regard to their professional nature.
Interstate Commerce
The jurisdictional scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act is limited 5 ' by
Congress' power to reach the defendant's conduct. 58 To be subject to the Act
"[t]he restraint must 'occur in or affect commerce between the states . . . for
constitutional reasons."' 159 As the traditional scope of Congress' power over

153. 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969).
154. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
155. Id. For a discussion of the noncommercial-commercial dichotomy, see Coons, NonCommercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962).
156. Id. at 654-55.
157. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
158. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8(3).
159. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 255 F.2d 214, 224 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), quoting and discussing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940).
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interstate commerce "has expanded over the years to reflect changing [judicial]
evaluations of the necessary scope of the federal commerce power, so too has
the reach of the Sherman Act." 160 Illustrative of this expansion of the com1
merce power is the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn.
61 There
the Court held that the growing of wheat for the grower's own on-farm consumption affected the total wheat supply and disposition and was therefore
within the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. 162
If it is determined that professional activity does constitute trade or commerce, a showing that the activity's effect is of an interstate nature must also
163
be made. It has been stated:
Congress' power over interstate commerce is plenary, encompassing not
only the regulation of interstate commerce itself, but all measures "necessary and proper" to that end, including regulation of commerce that
is purely intrastate.... The "necessary and proper" standard is met if
the regulated conduct has a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce.
It is dear from Wickard that the "substantial effect" necessary is defined
rather generously. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, since
"the conditions of... commerce have changed dramatically... over the years,
congressional power must be interpreted in light of 'the present state of commerce."164 Likewise, the principle that "commerce among the states is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one" has been expressed. 165
As has been suggested in the real estate brokerage area, 66 the significant
inquiry may be "whether the effect [of the professional activity] is sufficiently
substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the [Sherman] Act's terms to constitute a forbidden consequence."' 67 Under this approach, what is substantial and adverse should be determined in light of the
particular professional activity's effect upon the interstate economic process. 68

160. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972). See also
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Note, The
Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-PatmanAct, 22

HASTINS

L.J. 1245, 1247-55 (1971).

161. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
162. Id.
163. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972). See also National
Labor Relations Bd.v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936); Las Vegas Merchant
Plumber Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817,
rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954). One legal scholar states that "local restraints inherently tend to have some impact on interstate commerce." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

60 (1967).
164. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964).
165. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). See also United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 547 (1944).
166.

Note, Antitrust Law: An Emerging Problem for FloridaRealtors, 24 U. FLA. L. RXv.

266, 273 (1972).
167. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234

(1948).
168.

Cf. Note, supra note 166, at 273.
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An example of such a substantial effect occurred in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.169 In Goldfarb the price fixing activities of a local bar association were
brought within the scope of the Act when it was determined that the fixing
of real estate closing prices affected loans furnished for the purchase of homes,
a significant portion of the funds for which came from outside state boundaries.17o
Where the restraint involved consists of price fixing activities on the part
of local professional associations as in Goldfarb, the question of substantial
effect on interstate commerce will depend primarily upon the geographical
area in which the restraint is imposed. If the restraint is imposed in a large
metropolitan area, then, considering the transient nature of today's population,
the substantial effect will most likely be present. Conversely, if the restraint is
imposed in a small rural locality, the substantial effect would most likely be
absent. Where price fixing is imposed on a statewide basis, as in the adoption
of state bar minimum fee schedules, the proper consideration would be the
71
cumulative effect of the schedules' statewide use upon interstate commerce. 1
Clearly the substantial effect would be present in such a situation.
Similarly, the imposition of unreasonable restraints on entering the legal
and medical professions also poses a significant interstate commerce question.
The inquiry here must consider the increasing national orientation of the
practice of both law and medicine as well as the transient nature of today's
society. Realizing the practical effect upon commerce of foreclosing occupational opportunities to would-be attorneys and physicians, such activities
should be considered "sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress' para72
mount policy declared in the Act" to invoke the jurisdiction of the Act.1
17 3
However, it should be emphasized that in the: '
[A]rea [of anti-competitive activity under the commerce clause] perhaps
more than in most, each case must turn on its own facts. As the limits
to Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce are approached,
deciding the category in which a particular case falls becomes a matter
of degree.
State Action Immunity
The areas of professional activity, such as fee schedules and licensing requirements, which have been suggested as ripe for antitrust litigation'7 generally involve, at least to some extent, state regulation. This existence of state
regulation in turn raises an issue that has been the subject of much recent

169. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
170. Id. at 494.
171. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Note, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee
Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1235, 1245-47.
172. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234
(1948).
173. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972).
174.

See text accompanying notes 38-74 supra.
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litigationV75 and comment 176 - the applicability of federal antitrust law to
valid governmental action. At the heart of this issue is the concept that the
Sherman Act is aimed not at state action or official action directed by a state,
but at individual action. The leading case propounding this interpretation is
Parker v. Brown,177 which has been said to have "opened the eyes of the antitrust bar to the possibilities of avoiding the impact of the antitrust laws"
where state action is involvedIn Parkera private grower and packer sought to enjoin the enforcement of
a raisin marketing program as violative of the Sherman Act. The seasonal
proration marketing program, imposing both quota restrictions and minimum
prices on the sale of raisins, had been instituted by an agricultural commission
created pursuant to the California Agriculture Prorate Act.17 9 Before instituting a plan the commission was required to be petitioned by a certain number
of producers, to make economic findings, to hold two public hearings, and to
show generally that the plan would achieve the Act's stated purposes. After
approval by the commission the California Director of Agriculture would de180
dare the program in effect.
Faced with these circumstances the Supreme Court assumed that the
marketing programs would have violated the Sherman Act had they been instituted by private individuals, but, nevertheless held the combination outside
the scope of the antitrust laws.181 The programs had derived their "authority
and... efficacy from the legislative command of the state and ... [were] not
intended to operate or become effective without that command."'18 The Court
found:18 3
[N]othing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history ...
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature .... The Sherman Act makes
no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended
to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.

175. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1037 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
176. See, e.g., White, Participant Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust
Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TYXAs L. REv. 474 (1972); Comment, Alabama Power Co. v.
Alabama Elec. Cooperative: Rural Electrification and the Antitrust Laws -Irresistible Force
Meets Immovable Object, 55 VA. L. REv. 325 (1969).
177. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Other cases had previously dealt with the applicability of the
federal antitrust laws to state activity. See, e.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
178. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1037
(1972).
179. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, at 1969, Statutes of Cal., as amended, CAL. AGRIC. CODE

§59,501 (West 1968).
180. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943).
181. Id. at 352.
182.

Id. at 350.

183. Id. at 350-51
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Subsequent cases involving state regulation have generally interpreted the
Parker rationale as applicable to narrow factual circumstances184 with the
mere presence of the state casting no umbrella of immunity.5 5 For instance,
Parker involved not the mere existence of state governmental action, but
rather sovereign state regulatory action. 8 6 Accentuating the degree of state
regulatory action present, the Court there emphasized that the commission
charged with establishing the marketing programs was involved in the day-today operation of the programs. Thus, one commentator has suggested that the
underlying issue in determining the applicability of the Parker immunity is
"the degree of governmental involvement in, and supervision over, the allegedly wrongful private activity."'8x 7 Apparently agreeing, the courts have generally required the degree of governmental involvement to at least approach
that present in Parker.5 8
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission s9 found the degree of state involvement and
supervision insufficient to bring the appellant within the Parker immunity.
Cognizant that a state could have a public policy against free competition in
an industry important to it, the court noted that the state, in a proper
case, might go so far as to eliminate competition in that area. 190 However,
"such action must be state action, not individual action masquerading as state
action [since a] state can neither authorize individuals to perform acts which
violate the antitrust laws nor declare that such action is lawful."''9
One court has suggested that it may be inaccurate to speak in terms of valid
governmental immunity. In Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc.

92

the court posed the

over-all question as "to what extent, if any, the Congress intended to permit

184. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George P. Whitten, Jr., Inc.
v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); White,
supra note 176.
185. See. e.g., Schwegnan Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Alabama

Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968).
186. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
187. Comment, supra note 176, at 346. See also George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1970), wherein the court states: "[A]n anti-competitive practice may receive only the most cursory inspection by public officials . . .or public
officials may approve conduct without consideration or awareness of its anti-competitive
aspects .... The issue in such cases is not whether the action was in form 'governmental,'
but whether the real decision makers were public officials or private businessmen." Id. at 33
n.8.

188. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971).
189. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
190. The court recognized that the sale of tobacco was of great importance to the State
of North Carolina, but found that the operation of the business was in private hands. Id.

at 509.
191. Id. See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
192. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1037 (1972).
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action not consistent with the antitrust laws."'193 The Hecht court therefore
requires a close analysis of the kind and degree of governmental activity involved.'9 4 Espousing similar analyses, the Fifth Circuit has stated that courts
must "render both state regulatory and federal antitrust goals complimentary
rather than mutually exclusive." 95 Thus, the response to the question of
Parker immunity must include a balancing of the state and federal interests
involved.
Whether immunity will be granted to professional activities that involve
state regulation will of course depend upon the facts existing in each specific
circumstance. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar'98 immunity was denied the
county bar association that had instituted the minimum fee schedule. The
action there was determined to have been private and neither its authority
nor efficacy derived from the legislative command of the state. However, the
court did find that the activities of the state bar constituted valid governmental action and as such were immune under Parker. In so doing the court
stressed that the state bar had only a minor role in the unlawful activity and
there had been no assertion that the state bar's actions had not been within
the scope of either their statutory or rule created authority. 197
As previously noted, resolution of the state involvement issue will primarily
depend upon the specific arrangement and relationship existing in each case.
However, in those arrangements where anti-competitive programs have been
promulgated unilaterally by a professional association and then "rubber
stamped" by a state agency with no inquiry into the underlying justification
for or economic effect of such a program, the degree of state involvement required by Parker is absent. This rubber stamp arrangement apparently exists
in many situations in which legal and medical associations have been delegated
the authority to formulate licensing requirements for entry into their respective professions. 98 In such situations the Parker immunity should not be applicable and the paramount congressional policy to protect the welfare of the
consumer should prevail.
CONCLUSION

As has been repeatedly stated, the status or even existence of professional
immunity from antitrust laws is unclear. The assertion of such immunity,

193. Id. at 938. The court also proposed relevant criteria that should be employed in
resolving the question. Among these are: "[W]hether the governmental agency is required
to take into consideration the possible anti-competitive effect of its actions, whether the
agency is required to adhere to a clearly defined and restricted statutory directive, and to
what extent the agency's actions are subject to judicial review." Id. at 935.
194. See 13 B.C. IND. & Co-M. L. REv. 393, 407 (1971).
195. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
196. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
197. The state bar's role consisted of the power to institute disciplinary measures for
consistent violations of the schedule. Id. at 496.
198. See note 61 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss4/4

22

